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Heroes or Cowards? A New Look
at the Role of Native New Mexicans
at the Battle of Valverde
CHARLES MEKETA AND JACQUELINE MEKETA
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Misconceptions and errors regarding the role played by New Mexico's
Hispanic soldiers at the Battle of Valverde have survived for more than
a century, reflecting poorly on the reputation of a whole segment of
the population. Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commander of Union
forces defeated on February 21, 1862, in that bloody battle on the banks
of the Rio Grande north of Fort Craig, laid the blame for the loss, like
a mantle of shame, over the shoulders of the native people of New
Mexico. In his official report Colonel Canby wrote:
The battle was fought almost entirely by the regular troops
(trebled in number by the Confederates), with no assistance from
the militia, and but little from the volunteers, who would not obey
orders, or obeyed them too late to be of any service. The immediate
cause of the disaster at Valverde was the refusal of one of the
volunteer regiments to cross the river and support the left wing
Charles Meketa has done extensive research on the New Mexico volunteer soldiers
during the Civil War era and is the co-author, along with Jacqueline Meketa, of One
Blanket and Ten Days Riltions (1980). Jacqueline Meketa is the author of Louis Felsellthal:
Citizen-Soldier of Territorial New Mexico (1982) and Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafael Chacon,
a Nineteenth-Century New Mexican (1986).
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Battle of Valverde, February 21, 1862. Courtesy the authors.

of the army.... Large numbers of the militia and volunteers have
deserted, but this adds to rather than diminishes our strength. 1
Canby's allegations distorted reality to a considerable degree. He
failed to mention that mounted volunteer companies had been the first
Union troops to cross the Rio Grande and engage the enemy at sunrise,
and that five of them had fought throughout the day with courage and
valor. 2 He also seemed to overlook the fact that Colonel Kit Carson's
regiment, once he finally ordered it into battle, displayed exemplary
discipline and effectiveness and that a number of other volunteer and
militia units carried out their orders exactly.
1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies, Series 1(53 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 9: 487.
Since the overwhelming majority of the men serving as volunteers or militiamen were
Hispanics who had been born Mexican citizens, the implications of racial prejudice in
the Anglo perceptions and treatment of them is inescapable.
2. Captain Rafael Chacon of the First Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, stated
that he and his company, along with Captain James Graydon's Independent Spy Company, were the first two Union units to cross the Valverde ford against the Texans on
the morning of the battle. See Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, ed., Legacy of Honor: The Life
of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth-Century New Mexican (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1986), 166-67. Captains Pedro Sanchez, Juan Sarracino, and Ricardo Branch,
all of the Third Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, also fought as cavalrymen from early
morning under command of Colonel Jose M. Valdez.
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The pivotal point at which the Battle of Valverde was lost was the
capture of Captain Alexander McRae's battery of cannons by the Confederates. Colonel Canby not only claimed that volunteer troops assigned to its defense broke and ran in the face of the Confederate
charge but also that he could not get the necessary support from Colonel Miguel Pino's command and other Union troops to successfully
counterattack. This, he said, necessitated his order for a retreat from
the battlefield.
Not everyone else involved in the fighting that day agreed. Confederate sources, for instance, admit that their force, whose men and
horses were completely worn out, made a desperate charge from a
position where it was expected that "raking fire would slay the last
man of US."3 Even though the rebels were successful in capturing the
guns, they were further weakened by the casualties they sustained
and might not have been able to long withstand a Union counterattack.
More than one of the federal soldiers later said that they felt the order
to retreat had been unnecessarily premature and that the battle had
been lost at command level.
These opinions, of course, differed sharply from those of Colonel
Canby. He placed the onus of the defeat on the New Mexico volunteers
and militiamen. Over the years his words have been unquestioningly
used as the basis for most of the descriptions of events at Valverde.
The accounts of the few dissenters have been, until recently, mainly
overlooked. 4
Among those who spoke out in opposition to the official version
duiing the last century was A. A. Hayes, Jr. He wrote in 1880:
One cannot write the history of this remarkable campaign
without mentioning the strong opinion of some of Carson's fiery
fighters, and even at least one officer of distinction and experience,
that victory was within their grasp at Valverde and lost by mismanagement. s

3. Don E. Alberts, ed., Rebels on the Rio Grande: Civil War Journals of A. B. Peticolas
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 46.
4. There were, of course, exceptions. For some research that attempted to investigate
many aspects of the role played by the native troops at the battle, see William I. Waldrip,
"New Mexico during the Civil War," New Mexico Historical Review 28 (July 1953),163-82;
and Darlis A. Miller, "Hispanos and the Civil War in New Mexico: A Reconsideration,"
New Mexico Historical Review 54 (April 1979), 105-23.
5. A. A. Hayes, Jr., New Colorado and the Santa Fe Trail (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1880), 170.
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Captain Rafael Chacon commanded a company of mounted volunteers which was part of Colonel Carson's infantry regiment on the
right of the Union line. They successfully drove back two rebel attacks
on Robert Hall's battery just prior to the attack on McRae's battery.
Chacon, too, differed from Canby in his analysis of events:
At the hour the sun went down the order was given to retreat.
I, who already found myself very deep into the enemy zone because of the violence of our attack, did not understand the order
at first for we considered that our charge upon the enemy's main
cavalry had won the battle. I was so loath to leave the field that
my company was the last of our army to retreat and cross the_
river.... The regiment of Colonel Carson fought bravely on that
portion of the field assigned to them, and they would have retaken
the guns that the enemy had captured if the retreat had not sounded
just as they were advancing on the enemy for that purpose. 6
Another who disagreed was John W. Ellis, who served as a sergeant
in Company K, Fifth United States Infantry, during that battle. In May
1892 he recounted details of the fighting in a letter, which supported
the position that the brave and aggressive northern troops were thwarted
by bad decisions made at the highest level of command. Although
biased and not totally accurate, his letter said, in part:
At 7 0' clock in the morning the Battle of Valverde was fought,
and well and valiantly fought, while Col. Roberts of the 3rd
U.S. Cavalry was in command.... When he [Canby] did come
his first act was to move our batteries from their secure position
to one where they could the more easily be captured by the enemy-above a deep and heavy ravine, where Major Lockridge of
the Texas forces came up under the guns and captured them. Here
is where Ben Wingate and Col. Selden with 5 companies of the
5th made repeated charges to retake it, though Canby had three
or four times sent his aide-de-camp to tell him to retreat. But he
returned answer that he would never retreat until he again took
those guns. Finally, a cannon-ball striking him on a leg and shattering it, retreat was ordered and poor Ben was carried across the
river in a blanket and taken to the fort. Canby, that same evening,
went to see him (their rooms being opposite to one another in the
first block of officers' building at Fort Craig). He had no sooner
entered the door than poor old Ben tried to raise himself up, but
he was unable at all, and his last words were, "Leave me. You are
6. Meketa, Legacy of Honor, 169-70.
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E. R. S. Canby. Courtesy National
Archives.
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Benjamin S. Roberts. Courtesy
Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion, and
the U.s. Army Military History Institute.

a traitor. Could I but live to get to Washington!" Thus died as brave
and true a soldier as ever wore the blue, respected and beloved
by his men and his superiors.?
Alonzo 'lckis, a Colorado volunteer, also complained that after
Canby assumed command affairs on the battlefield worsened and that
the fight was lost by bad management. He asserted that "The padre
told Col. Canby he was a traitor. Canby had him placed under guard
for two hours and then released."8
The account of William W. Mills, who had been assigned as an
acting second lieutenant on Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts' staff on the
day of the battle, also supports the position that Colonel Canby, rather
than the indicted New Mexicans, was responsible for the outcome of
7. J. Robert seynn, ed., "A Soldier in New Mexico, 1860-1885," £1 Palacio 65 (August
1958), 143-45. This is a bit theatrical. Captain Ben Wingate did not die immediately, but
lingered on before succumbing on June 1 to complications arising from his shattered
leg.
8. Nolie Mumey, ed., Bloody Trails Along the Rio Grande: A day-by-day Diary of Alonzo
Ferdinand lckis, 1836-1917 (Denver: Old West Publishing Company, 1958), 82.
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the Battle of Valverde. He described events, beginning at 2 p.m., as
follows:
The New Mexican volunteers were keeping the enemy from
the water and skirmishing briskly at times ... So far all was favorable for us except the repulse of Selden.
We had kept them from the water, McRae had beaten their
battery, and the Coloradoans had gained an advantage. We were
well posted and provided; their animals and men were weary and
without water. They could not retreat; they must surrender or
starve or fight quickly and desperately.... At three o'clock that
afternoon General Canby appeared on the field .... after a brief
consultation with Roberts he advanced our battery about five hundred yards, withdrew Selden from its support, leaving only two
companies to protect it, and opened fire. Carson's Mexican regiment had been moved to our right and advanced, and with one
company of Regulars repulsed a charge of Texas cavalry with some
loss. I observed Carson closely. He walked up and down his line,
quietly encouraging his men with such words as "Firme, muchachos, firme." [Steady, boys, be firm.] ... I admired General
Canby alike for his courage as for his amiable character, but I
believe that if Col. Roberts had been left to carry out his plans that
day Valverde would have been a Union victory and the campaign
closed. 9
Thus it would seem that there were manydisgruntled soldiers and
officers among the Union troops after the battle. They faulted Colonel
Canby both for his repositioning of troops upon his arrival on the
battlefield and also for what they saw as his premature order to retreat.
It is also true that Governor Henry Connelly asserted, at the time, that
as the battery was being overrun, Canby ordered other regulars in the
vicinity to advance to its defense but that they refused, setting an
example for some volunteer soldiers who then followed their lead. 10
Yet, even today, it is easy to find accounts by historians, even those
of national repute, who do not fault Canby's command decisions or
the actions of the regulars. Instead, they repeat the tired, old allegations
that the New Mexicans refused to fight.
Canby's degree of responsibility for the final fiasco needs to be
illuminated and the record corrected. After all, his decision to reposition
McRae's battery to a more vulnerable position and then withdraw some
9. William Wallace Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 1858-1898 (Chicago: Press of W. B.
Conkey, 1901), 56-59.
10. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 638.
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of its support to bolster Hall's cannons on the right was a tactical error.
The Confederate charge against Hall was made by a small diversionary
force and a rebel contingent at least three times larger overran the illfated McRae position. Furthermore, if the facts are impartially examined, those groups of volunteers that Canby specifically cited as responsible for the Union loss can be partly or wholly exonerated.
Two volunteer units that have long been castigated for their role
in the Battle of Valverde were the two companies of New Mexicans
which formed part of the support for McRae's battery-those of Captains Santiago Hubbell and William Mortimore. Captain P. W. L.
Plympton, a regular army officer, in explaining why his battalion had
failed to save the guns from the rebel charge, reported that at the
moment of the attack "a body of Volunteers (Mexican) were seized with
a panic who broke from their positions immediately in front of a portion
of my command and rushed precipitously i~to the river and, I regret
to say, took with them a portion of the left of my battalion in spite of
my individual efforts to stop that flight."11 This accusation was subsequently repeated by Canby in his official report to Washington. This
report resulted in the wide-spread belief that the men of the two volunteer companies ran, thus losing both the battery and the battle.
For many, Canby's report supplied an easy, pat explanation and
named the culprits. No one asked obvious questions such as why
volunteer troops, criticized for months previously by most of the Anglo
professional soldiers as incompetent, would have been placed in a
strategically significant position by Captain Plympton. Also unasked
was what sort of casualty rate the two companies suffered during the
action, and who else, on either side, reported that the first line of
defenders broke and ran.
Eyewitness accounts of the charge upon McRae's battery fail to
make mention of Union troops assigned to defend it as panicking and
deserting in the face of the enemy. Union Colonel Roberts said that
McRae's position was held "with unexampled determination" until
captured, and Governor Connelly spoke of the great losses inflicted
upon the rebels by the battery defenders. Confederate Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Scurry told of his men making a charge "into a driving storm
of grape and cannister and musket balls sent hurling around [them]";
and another southern officer, Colonel Thomas Green, described how
his men made "a most desperate charge and in hand-to-hand conflict
11. Plympton to Henry R. Selden, February 24, 1862, part 1, entry 3183, Records
of the U.S. Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.

40

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JANUARY 1987

completely overwhelmed them, killing most of their gunners and driving the infantry into the river." 12
In order to attempt to determine whether Hubbell's and Mortimore's companies were indeed culpable, an analysis of their casualty
rate was made and compared to those of other units on the scene. A
compilation of the final fatality figures (which would include not only
those who died immediately but also those who perished within days
or a month or two as a direct result of wounds received that day) set
the total number of Union soldiers killed at 100. Of these, eighty were
members of the eight units used to support McRae's guns. Not all, but
most, were killed in the bloody few minutes during which the battery
was charged and captured. In addition, of the 122 Union soldiers listed
as wounded (and surviving) at Valverde, eighty-seven were among the
men clustered around the guns, as were forty-eight of the eighty-seven
listed as missing. 13
A breakdown by company was made to determine which of the
eight units suffered the heaviest casualties in proportion to its size. It
was immediately obvious that Company F of the Seventh U.S. Infantry
sustained the severest losses, by percentage, with nineteen men killed,
seventeen wounded, and six missing out of a complement of sixtynine. 14 Using the same measurements, it also became clear that the
long-vilified Hubbell's company of volunteers incurred the second worst
damage suffered by any Union company at Valverde during the combat.
Out of seventy-four fighters they lost nineteen killed, eleven wounded,
and eight missing-hardly statistics which are compatible with flight
in the face of the enemy. Surprisingly, McRae's individual command
12. War of the Rebellion, Series 1, 9: 515, 520.
13. Colonel Edward Canby originally reported three officers and sixty-five enlisted
men killed at Valverde and three officers and 157 enlisted men wounded. A number of
the wounded, however, succumbed in succeeding days and weeks. In an attempt to
determine, once and for all, the final cost in death and suffering for the Union troops
at Valverde, exhaustive searches, screenings, and cross-checking was done with the
following sources: the official reports of the Battle of Valverde, in War of the Rebellion; the
Fort Craig post returns; individual military service records of the volunteer soldiers
involved, in the National Archives; a report of killed, wounded, and missing U.S. troops
from the Battle of Valverde, which is part 1, entry 3183, Records of the U.S. Continental
Commands, 1821-1920, RG 393, National Archives; and "List of Officers and Enlisted
Men Killed and Died of Wounds Received at the Battle of Valverde in the Territory of
New Mexico Buried at Fort Craig," dated March 14, 1867, which was compiled by the
adjutant general's office in Washington for those involved in the planning for the Soldiers
Monument which was erected in the plaza in Santa Fe.
14. The company strength figures are approximate in the sense that it cannot be
determined beyond the shadow of a doubt that every single member of a particular unit
was present on the battlefield that day.
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of personnel actually manning the guns, long rumored to have been
heroes who "died down to the last man bravely protecting their weapons," was less damaged proportionally, with eighteen fatalities, fifteen
wounded, and eight missing out of approximately eighty-three men.
Mortimore's company, the other volunteer unit, lost four killed,
four wounded, and an unknown number missing. Exactly how many
of the company's men were present that day is uncertain since some
had been sent away to guard horses held at a grazing camp some miles
away, but the number was probably between forty-five and fifty. These
figures would make Mortimore's unit's casualties similar to several of
the regular army companies protecting the guns, although Mortimore
himself was wounded and one of his sergeants is known to have been
captured by the Texans.
While it is true that no one, other than those men who were present
on that particular portion of the battlefield that day, knows exactly
what happened, it is hard if not impossible to reconcile the Hubbell
company's record with that of a unit of cowardly deserters who fled
from the scene of action. If they were the ones Plympton was referring
to, then they were driven back after taking terrible casualties. If, instead, it was some portion of Mortimore's company which was the
culprit, then Hubbell's men should not have been covered by a blanket
castigation. And one is also left to conclude that several of the regular
army companies whose casualty rates were so similar to Mortimore's
may be those who also fled, yet no criticism of any of the regulars ever
seemed to find its way into print in the succeeding years in the histories
written by Anglo-Americans.
Using the figure of 100 men killed as a direct result of the Battle
of Valverde, as earlier established, it becomes clear that since twentynine of the dead were New Mexico volunteers they represent a significant percentage of total Union fatalities. In addition, at least twenty
New Mexicans can be documented as wounded.
Figures on the missing, however, cannot be accurately tabulated.
Some may have been stragglers who turned up later; others could have
-been captured and subsequently paroled; some may have been deserters; and still others could have been injured, like one private who
sustained a grave facial wound during the charge on McRae's guns,
staggered away from the field of combat, and made his way to a nearby
ranch. Found by the rancher, the profusely bleeding man, who was
barely able to speak, was taken to Socorro by wagon. From there, the
soldier was somehow transported to the village of Polvadera, where
he was observed lying in a wagon for several days, appearing to be at
death's door. At that point, the Texans arrived and captured the town,
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so he was technically a prisoner. The army, however, listed the man
as a deserter. Surprisingly, the private survived and eventually was
well enough to appeal his dishonorable discharge. He was exonerated
and awarded his back pay several years later. IS
Another of Canby's primary scapegoats was Colonel Miguel Pino's
Second Infantry Regiment of volunteers. This was the unit he accused
of failure to ford the river. This he pinpointed as the immediate cause
of the loss of McRae's battery and the subsequent retreat. In contrast,
Pino's official report stated that when the order to cross was received
he and his men began to comply. Pino, however, claimed that "while
this movement was being executed we were ordered back to form on
the western bank where we took our position and fired upon the enemy
until ordered to return to Fort Craig."16 At least one company from
Pino's regiment, along with part of another one, did manage to cross
the river before the general retreat began.
Several years later, an article in a Santa Fe newspaper disputed
Canby's criticism of Pino's regiment, saying:
Again, it was said that Col. Pino's volunteers did not do what
was expected of it [sic] at the battle of Valverde when the fact was
it did all that it was ordered to do on that day and if it did not
participate in the battle it was because it was assigned to other
duty in the early part of the day, in watching the enemy opposite
Fort Craig, and did not receive orders to march to Valverde until
it was too late for it to reach the battlefield before McRae's battery
was charged and taken and our forces on the retreat to the fort.
But two of his companies crossed the river. The charge upon the
battery was not made until some time after Col. Pino was ordered
to abandon his position on the opposite side of the river from Fort
Craig and proceed to the battlefield. His leaving that position relieved a reserve for the Texans .... They too were ordered up to
join the battle. Their line of march was nearly direct, whilst that
of Col. Pino was circuitous. The former consequently .reached the
scene of action first and it is supposed that that reserve formed in
the main the party which so daringly and successfully charged
McRae's batteryY
A thorough analysis of all the available accounts, both Union and
Confederate, and the application of some common sense, leads to the
15. Individual service record, Felipe Maes, Company A, Third Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, National Archives.
16. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 503.
17. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, May 9, 1863.
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Santiago Hubbell. Courtesy New
Mexico State Records Center and
Archives.
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Rafael Chacon, from Historia illustrada de' nuevo mexico.

conclusion that Pino's command was innocent of the charges leveled
against it. Confederate reports verify that troops earlier stationed across
from Fort Craig took an active part in the' final charge of the day. Pino's
men had been required to march at least seven miles while escorting ,
a slow-moving ammunition train, and were forced to ford the Rio
Grande twice-all time-consuming operations. Amazingly, even Canby's report itself seems to verify Pino's version. He said the unit "was
just coming up" when Hall's battery was attacked and that while the
Texans were being repulsed, "At this moment a formidable storming
party ... moved rapidly upon McRae's battery. "18
Canby's blanket denunciation of a militia that had been of "no
assistance" at Valverde failed to differentiate between several groups
of militiamen. He also failed to credit several which did excellent service
away from the actual battle site. Records are scarce, but it is known
that one group of organized militia was ordered to garrison Fort Craig
on the day of the battle and did so, exactly as told, thereby releasing
other troops to be used in the affray. A second group of three hundred
mounted militiamen of the Second New Mexico Militia, commanded
by Colonel Nicolas Pino, was sent to the west side of the Rio Grande
18. War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9: 490.
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where they encountered some Texans and exchanged fire with them.
The rebels then fled toward the battleground. Pino's men began to
pursue them, but received other orders to cut off some enemy wagons.
They discovered an abandoned Confederate ammunition train and
blew it up, destroying much of the Texans' supplies. By the time they
had completed this objective and returned to the fort, it was 10:30 p.m.
and the battle was long over.
In the days after the battle, the "blackwash" of the native soldiers
spread quickly. By February 28, the acting inspector-general in Santa
Fe wrote to General Henry Halleck in St. Louis:
Colonel Canby did everything which man could do to retake his
battery and thus save the day. He beseeched and begged, ordered
and imperatively commanded, troops to save his guns, and a deaf
ear met alike his supplications and commands .... It is needless
to say that this country is in a critical condition. The militia have
all run away, and the New Mexican volunteers are deserting in
large numbers. No dependence whatever can be placed on the
natives; they are worse than useless; they are really aids of the
enemy, who catch them, take their arms, and tell them to go home. 19
Canby also continued his campaign of indiscriminately sullying
the reputations of all the native troops. On March 7, he wrote to another
officer, stating baldly: "Do not trust the Mexican troops. If the Colorado
or Kansas or California troops have not joined you, do not risk an
engagement against the Confederates until they do."20 He reiterated
the warning throughout March in various pieces of correspondence,
that no reliance was to be placed on the New Mexican troops except
for garrisons or for partisan operations.
Once applied, the stigma stuck. In the years that followed some
outrageously distorted charges against the native New Mexican soldiers were disseminated, always from Anglo pens. One colorful example was a speech made by Joseph McC. Bell, a regular who had
been assigned to serve as a lieutenant with the Second New Mexico
Volunteers on the day of the battle. The talk, given to a fraternal organization of veterans twenty-five years later and ostensibly delivered
to give an accurate picture of the military campaign in New Mexico in
1862, was rife with incorrect facts and convoluted Victorian rhetoric.
Bell said:
19. Ibid., 634.
20. Ibid., 647.
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Of these two New Mexican Regiments [First and Second Volunteers] too little cannot be said of their valor nor too much of their
inefficiency. Before the insidious advances of the "tortilla" they
were invincible; the red hot chili colorado had no terrors for them,
~nd against whole batteries of canistered beans, Caesar was nowhere. But for anything indigestible, as grape, unfermented, they
retired with respectful celerity, which the demoralization of a single six-pound shot precipitated a stampede equaled only by a break
of terrified buffalo. This little tribute to our Mexican allies, ... I
cannot defer the pleasure of offering now, that there may be no
mistake as to the romantic notion that very much of the valiant
blood of the Hidalgos flows in the veins of the average New Mexican. 21
Further, Bell stated that "at an early moment in our first fight"
Colonel Carson's command, made up of native soldiers, forsook him,
departing and leaving him to fight alone. He further embellished the
story by saying that "Kit went in single-handed and fought the fight
out." Carson's regiment, Bell claimed, was never collected again after
they scattered, and as a result of these events the government awarded
Carson a promotion to general. 22
Bell's ridiculous allegations that the First Regiment of New Mexico
Volunteers ran illustrates how badly garbled many post-battle reports
tended to be. Some self-styled experts failed to distinguish between
Colonel Miguel Pino's Second Regiment of New Mexico Volunteers
and Colonel Nicolas Pino's Second Regiment of New Mexico Militia;
others attributed the sins of a small number of native troops to many
innocent warriors; and still others tended to tar all New Mexicans with
the same brush, while conveniently overlooking any shortcomings exhibited by Anglo soldiers.
It is imperative that historians utilizing Anglo-American sources
describing events during this period in New Mexico history evaluate
them with an understanding of the attitudes of that time. The same
racial and cultural convictions which had fostered the mentality of
Manifest Destiny were at work. Not only were the citizens of Mexican
21. Joseph McC. Bell, "The Campaign of New Mexico, 1862," War Papers (Milwaukee:
Burdick, Armitage and Allen, 1891), I: 47-71. Bell's account contains many statements
that research does not support, and should be approached with skepticism.
22. Many eyewitness accounts state that Kit Carson's First Regiment retreated across
the river and marched back to Fort Craig "in good order, almost as though they were
on parade." Some of those making these assertions were Captain Rafael Chacon, Captain
Edward Bergmann, Captain Louis Felsenthal, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Francisco Chaves,
all of the unit.
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background arbitrarily judged inferior as an entire body, but the volunteer soldiers were also denigrated by the professional army men.
The New Mexicans were relatively powerless, without influence or
contacts in high places in the government or military. They therefore
became the perfect targets for accusations and recriminations. Citing
them as the ultimate cause of the defeat diverted responsibility or blame
from the professional soldiers and safeguarded their future careers.
Long and tedious research has shown, time and time again, that
many contemporary source materials written by Anglo-Americans of
that era which claimed that native troops deserted, are false. 23 Other
sins of omission and comission are common, always, seemingly, to the
detriment of the New Mexicans. 24
The long duration and wide dissemination of these accusations
and untruths had to be frustrating and disturbing not only to the
stalwart fighters who gambled their lives in the service of the United
States, but also to their descendants.

23. Examples can be found in various places. On March 10, 1862, Major J. L. Donaldson, commander of the Santa Fe district, reporting on his march to Fort Union, said,
"Some volunteers also accompanied me, under Lieut. Col. Chavez [sic], but all of them
except the lieutenant-colonel and some officers deserted on the march." This has subsequently been reported as fact. However, research reveals that approximately one-half
of the men left because their six-month enlistment periods were up. Some were erroneously reported as deserters but several years later were exonerated when it was shown
that in fact they had completed their tours of duty. Alonzo lckis, in Mumey, ed., Bloody
Trails Along the Rio Grande, 86, wrote from Fort Craig that "Forty of Kit's men deserted
last night (March 6, 1862) they took ponies and arms with them." This was exactly the
time when approximately forty officers and noncoms from two of Carson's companies
were sent out, under orders, for northern New Mexico. The companies had been cannibalized for personnel to bring other units up to strength and the men went on recruiting
duty to refill them. Examinations of men's individual service and pension records also
turn up innumerable other cases where volunteers were erroneously or unjustly accused
of desertion.
24. Again, examples are numerous. Canby, in his report to Washington on April
11, 1862 (War of the Rebellion, Series I, 9:550), speaks of a skirmish at Albuquerque, stating
that "Captain Graydon's Spy Company, supported by the Regular cavalry," took part
but fails to include any mention of Rafael Chacon and his company. (See Meketa, ed.,
Legacy of Honor, 184.) Also, although never acknowledged in the official reports reproduced in the War of the Rebellion, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chaves and a group of New
Mexico volunteers, including men from Chacon's company, fought the Confederates at
Apache Canyon on March 26, 1862, and also accompanied Major J. M. Chivington to
Johnson's Ranch on March 28 and took part in the encounter with the rebels when the
Confederate supply wagons were burned. Chivington listed the units which accompanied him in his official report but failed to mention Chaves by name or the New
Mexicans, even though it is known that Chaves led the colonel to the wagon train. See
Meketa, ed., Legacy of Honor, 183, 384.

